Tax Incentives: A Means of Encouraging Research and Development for Homeland Security? by Venghaus, Jennifer L.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 4 Article 11
5-2003
Tax Incentives: A Means of Encouraging Research
and Development for Homeland Security?
Jennifer L. Venghaus
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Tax Law
Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer L. Venghaus, Tax Incentives: A Means of Encouraging Research and Development for Homeland Security?, 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1213
(2002).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss4/11
COMMENTS
TAX INCENTIVES: A MEANS OF ENCOURAGING
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY? *
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the events on and around September 11, 2001, Ameri-
cans have learned that "American soil is not immune to evil or
cold-blooded enemies capable of unprecedented acts of mass mur-
der and terror."' We have recognized the need for increased
homeland security, the prevention of and protection from terror-
ists and chemical/biological weapons, and that "[tihe Nation's in-
vestments in innovation and discovery are... vital to strengthen-
ing our capabilities to combat terrorism and defend our country."2
These reasons have led to an increased need for research and de-
velopment ("R&D")3 in these areas. Although the United States
government has attempted for many years to encourage private
*This Comment was the first-place winner of the 2003 McNeill Writing Competition,
sponsored by the McNeill Law Society of the University of Richmond School of Law.
1. GEORGE W. BUSH, SECURING THE HOMELAND STRENGTHENING THE NATION 2
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland securitybook.pdf
(last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
2. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 159 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
3. In this paper, "research and development" and "research and experimentation" are
used interchangeably. Both terms are used in this paper because, although "research and
development" is the more common term, many statutes refer to "research and experimen-
tation."
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businesses to engage in R&D through tax incentives,4 recent
events in the United States have made the need more apparent,
and the current tax incentives are no longer adequate for encour-
aging the requisite level of R&D.
Since 1981, the United States has attempted to encourage R&D
through two main provisions of the Tax Code: sections 41' and
174.6 Until last year, these provisions were sufficient to encour-
age the R&D needed in the United States, but the provisions are
no longer adequate for the current climate. For example, even
though the tax provisions in section 174 are permanent, 7 the cur-
rent research and experimentation ("R&E") tax credit, found in
section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code, will expire in 2004. As
the events of September 11, 2001 remain vivid in our minds, poli-
ticians try to determine whether to extend the tax credit found in
section 41 beyond 2004.
The increasing need for R&D in the area of homeland security
over the last year has led politicians to the realization that some
incentives are necessary to stimulate R&D. Questions exist, how-
ever, as to whether the current tax credit for R&E is the most ef-
fective method of meeting this purpose. This paper will analyze
tax incentives as a means of encouraging R&D for homeland se-
curity.
Part II will explore current tax provisions related to R&D ex-
penses, namely sections 174 and 41. Part III will examine the im-
portance of R&D and the need for change in incentives in the
United States. This part will also explain several proposals put
4. "Tax incentives are the result of special exclusions, exemptions, deductions, cred-
its, deferrals, or tax rates in the federal tax laws. Unlike grants, tax incentives do not gen-
erally permit the same degree of federal oversight and targeting, and they are generally
available by formula to all potential beneficiaries who satisfy congressionally established
criteria." Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to Success:
Testimony Before the House Subcomm. on Gov't Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt., and Intergovern-
mental Relations, Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. 17 (2002) (statement of Paul L.
Posner, Managing Director, Fed. Budget Issues, Strategic Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office), available at http://www.gao.gov (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
5. I.R.C. § 41 (2000).
6. I.R.C. § 174 (2000).
7. I.R.C. section 174 is said to be "permanent," because it does not have a sunset pro-
vision, such as section 41(h).
8. See id. § 41(h)(1)(B). This termination date is periodically changed by Congress.
The most recent change, made in 1999, changed the expiration from June 30, 1999 to June
30, 2004. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
170, 113 Stat. 1860, 1919 (codified at 26 I.R.C. §§ 41, 45(c)).
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forth by politicians over the last few years and analyze their
strengths and weaknesses. In particular, this part will discuss
Senate Bill 1764, proposed by Connecticut Senator Joseph Lie-
berman, and President George W. Bush's tax relief plan. Part IV
will focus on tax incentives as a means of encouraging R&D in the
United States. This part will analyze the policy reasons for using
tax incentives to encourage R&D rather than using other gov-
ernment incentives. Part V will conclude that tax incentives
should be used, along with federal subsidy programs, in order to
effectively encourage R&D.
II. THE CURRENT TAX CODE
Under the current tax code, two provisions are used as incen-
tives for R&D. Section 174 allows for immediate deduction or am-
ortization of R&D expenses.9 Section 41 allows a tax credit for
qualified R&D expenses.1" This tax credit is non-refundable and
incremental, and is available to companies with increased R&D
expenses. These two provisions are intended to provide an incen-
tive for companies to engage in R&D by giving companies tax
benefits for related expenses.
A. Section 174
Before the enactment of section 174 in 1954, it was unclear
how to treat R&D expenses. Generally, expenses were deducted
for tax purposes if they were ordinary business expenses and
capitalized for all other R&D expenses. In 1919, 1922, and 1924,
the Internal Revenue Bureau1' issued regulations allowing busi-
nesses to either deduct the R&D expenses or capitalize them. 12
Although the Internal Revenue Bureau issued regulations allow-
ing businesses to deduct R&D expenses, the United States Tax
Court "generally continued to require taxpayers to capitalize all
9. See infra Part II.A. See generally I.R.C. § 174.
10. See infra Part II.B. See generally I.R.C. § 41.
11. At that time, the Internal Revenue Service was called the Internal Revenue Bu-
reau.
12. David S. Hudson, The Tax Concept of Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW.
85, 86-87 (1991) (citing Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919)).
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research and development costs." 13 In 1954, Congress decided to
"encourage new research and development activity and thus
stimulate economic growth and technological development."14 In
response, Congress enacted the first R&D tax incentive in the
United States in 1954 by adding section 174 to the Internal
Revenue Code.1"
Section 174 consists of two separate tax incentives for R&D.
Section 174(a) allows for the immediate deduction of R&D ex-
penses,16 and section 174(b) allows the taxpayer to amortize the
expenses. 7 Under section 174(a), the "taxpayer may treat re-
search or experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred
by him during the taxable year in connection with his trade or
business as expenses which are not chargeable to [a] capital ac-
count. The expenditures so treated shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion."" Under section 174(b), the taxpayer may treat "research or
experimental expenditures" as deferred expenses if they are "paid
or incurred by the taxpayer in connection with his trade or busi-
ness,... not treated as expenses under subsection (a), and...
chargeable to [a] capital account but not chargeable to property of
a character which is subject to the allowance under section
167... or section 611. "19 These expenses may be deducted over a
period greater than sixty months.2 °
Although section 174 applies to research and experimental ex-
penditures, this section does not apply to "the acquisition or im-
provement of land" or "property to be used in connection with the
research or experimentation,"2 "exploration expenditures,"22 or
13. Id. at 88.
14. William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for Research and Development: An Analysis
and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J. 347, 349 (1987); see S. REP. NO. 97-144 (1981), reprinted in
1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 181-82 (stating that "the decline in this country's research and
development activities has adversely affected economic growth, productivity gains, and
our competitiveness in world markets").
15. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 66. See 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4194, 4851, 5280 for legislative reports on the enactment of I.R.C. § 174.
16. I.R.C. § 174(a) (2000).
17. Id. § 174(b). Amortization is "[t]he act or result of apportioning the initial cost of a
[usually] intangible asset, such as a patent, over the asset's useful life." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 1999).
18. I.R.C. § 174(a)(1).
19. Id. § 174(b)(1).
20. Id. § 174(b)(1)(C).
21. Id. § 174(c).
22. Id. § 174(d).
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unreasonable expenses under certain circumstances.23 Because
there are few limitations to the applicability of section 174, it may
be assumed that Congress intended broad applicability of the sec-
tion.24 However, after the enactment of section 174, the Internal
Revenue Service narrowly interpreted the statute, allowing the
deduction only when the taxpayer was actually "engaged in a
trade or business," rather than "in connection with his trade or
business."25 In Snow v. Commissioner,26 the Internal Revenue
Service did not allow Edwin Snow to take a deduction for the re-
search expenses of his partnership because Snow was a limited
partner and had not actually participated in the business. The
Supreme Court of the United States held that section 174 was
meant to encourage R&D and, thus, Snow should be allowed to
take the deduction.2" Since the Court in Snow overruled the In-
ternal Revenue Service's interpretation of "in connection with his
trade or business," section 174 has been interpreted more
broadly, as Congress intended.29
B. Section 41
In 1981, twenty-seven years after enacting section 174, Con-
gress enacted section 41-another tax incentive for R&D. Section
41 attempted to provide an incentive for increased R&D, particu-
larly for technology fields.3 ° In order to prevent section 41 from
becoming a windfall to some businesses, Congress limited the
types of research that qualify for the tax credit under section 41."'
23. Id. § 174(e).
24. Evan Wamsley, Note, The Definition of Qualified Research Under the Section 41
Research Development Tax Credit: Its Impact on the Credit's Effectiveness, 87 VA. L. REV.
165, 167 (2001) (stating that "the range of qualified activities contained in it is quite
broad").
25. Natbony, supra note 14, at 349. See I.R.C. § 174(a), for the language of the Code
section.
26. 416 U.S. 500 (1974).
27. See id. at 501.
28. Id. at 504.
29. See id. at 503.
30. Wamsley, supra note 24, at 166. See 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105 for legislative reports
on the enactment of I.R.C. § 41.
31. See I.R.C. § 41(b), (d) (2000); see also infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing windfalls
briefly).
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Section 41 is a non-refundable, incremental tax credit for com-
panies with increased levels of R&D expenses.3 2 Under the cur-
rent version, section 41 allows a tax credit of twenty percent of:
(1) "qualified research expenses" that exceed "the base amount";33
and (2) "basic research payments. '34 Qualified research expenses
include "in-house research expenses" and "contract research ex-
penses."" This includes wages for qualified services, supplies, and
sixty-five percent of any payment to a third party for qualified re-
search. 6 The base amount is calculated by multiplying the "fixed-
base percentage" and the "average annual gross receipts" for the
previous four years.3 7 The fixed-base percentage is calculated as
the total qualified research expenses for the years 1984 through
1988 as a percentage of the total gross receipts for those years,38
with a minimum base amount as fifty percent of qualified re-
search expenses. 9 However, companies that started after 1983,
and companies without gross receipts and qualified research ex-
penses for three years between 1983 and 1988, calculate their
fixed-base percentage using the percentages set forth in section
41(c)(3)(B)(ii).40 Taxpayers may also elect to use an "alternative
incremental credit," found in section 41(c)(4).4
32. Increased levels of R&D expenses mean that companies are required to increase
their expenses from year-to-year in order to be eligible for the credit. Companies with high
amounts of R&D expenses that do not increase their expenses from year-to-year are not
eligible for the credit, even though they conduct a great deal of R&D. See I.R.C. § 41; see
also Wamsley, supra note 24, at 166.
33. I.R.C. § 41(a)(1).
34. Id. § 41(a)(2).
35. Id. § 41 (b)(1).
36. Id. § 41 (b)(2)-(3). "Qualified research" has a very complex definition, found in §
41(d), which has been changed and interpreted many times since the credit's beginning.
For a general discussion of "qualified research," see generally Wamsley, supra note 24,
and Hudson, supra note 12, at 98-102.
37. I.R.C. § 41(c)(1).
38. Id. § 41(c)(3). Although it is now twenty-one years after the enactment of this
credit, the years used in calculating the fixed base percentage have not changed. Compare
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 241 (1981) (original
statute language), with I.R.C. § 41(c)(3)(A) (current statute language).
39. I.R.C. § 41(c)(2); see infra Part III.A.4 (discussing how the minimum base amount
decreases the effective rate of the section 41 credit).
40. I.R.C. § 41(c)(3)(B)(ii).
41. Id. § 41(c)(4). The "alternative incremental credit" has been the subject of some
recent changes. See H.R. REP. No. 106-478, at 130 (1999); Tax Relief Extension Act of
1999, S. 1792, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999); H.R. 2923, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
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The second tax credit under section 41-the credit for "basic
research payments"-is described in section 41(e).42 Under this
subsection, a basic research payment is "any amount paid in
cash ... to any qualified organization for basic research" if it is
"pursuant to a written agreement" and "is to be performed by
such qualified organization."43 Under section 41(e), taxpayers
may receive a tax credit of twenty percent for basic research
payments exceeding the "qualified organization base period
amount."' Those payments that do not exceed the "qualified or-
ganization base period amount" may be incorporated into the
company's "contract research expenses" under section
41(e)(1)(B).45
Since its original enactment in 1981, section 41 has been
amended thirteen times.46 The most recent amendment, in 1999,
was part of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement
Act of 1999. 4' This amendment extended the expiration date of
the section 41 tax credit from June 30, 1999 to June 30, 2004, in-
creased the percentages of the alternative incremental tax credit,
and extended the credit to Puerto Rico and other United States
territories.48 Much discussion went into the enactment of the
Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. 49
President Clinton considered section 41 a "crucial tax credit,"
hoping the amendment would "encourage[ ] companies to under-
42. I.R.C. § 41(e).
43. Id. § 41(e)(2)(A).
44. Id. § 41(e)(1)(A).
45. Id. § 41(e)(1)(B).
46. See Pub. L. No. 106-170, sec. 502, 113 Stat. 1919 (1999); Pub. L. No. 105-277, sec.
1001, 112 Stat. 2681-2888 (1998); Pub. L. No. 105-34, sec. 601, 111 Stat. 861 (1997); Pub.
L. No. 104-188, secs. 1201, 1204, 110 Stat. 1772-1774 (1996); Pub. L. No. 103-66, secs.
13111, 13112, 13201, 107 Stat. 420, 421, 459 (1993); Pub. L. No. 102-227, sec. 102, 105
Stat. 1686 (1991); Pub. L. No. 101-508, secs. 11101, 11402, 104 Stat. 1388-1405, 1388-
1473 (1990); Pub. L. No. 101-239, secs. 7110, 7814, 103 Stat. 2322-25, 2414 (1989); Pub. L.
No. 100-647, secs. 1002, 4007, 4008, 102 Stat. 3370, 3652 (1988); Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec.
231, 100 Stat. 2173-80 (1986); Pub. L. No. 98-369, secs. 471, 474, 98 Stat. 826, 831 (1984);
Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2372 (1983); Pub. L. No. 97-354, sec. 5, 96 Stat. 1692 (1982).
47. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999). This Act was signed into law by President William J. Clinton
on December 17, 1999. See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R.
1180, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2637 (Dec. 17, 1999).
48. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act § 502.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 106-478 (1999).
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take new multi-year research activities."5 ° Politicians are already
discussing the idea of amending section 41 again.51
III. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
Although in a perfect tax system, the tax system does not affect
the decisions of taxpayers and is not affected by changes in soci-
ety, 2 "most scholars believe the U.S. income tax system distorts
behavior." 3 Therefore, under the current system, as society
changes, the tax code must also change.54 Despite the recent
amendment of the tax provisions regarding R&D expenses, more
changes are needed in order to achieve the policy goals intended
for the R&D tax incentives and to meet the changing needs of the
United States in this area.55
A. The Current System Is Inefficient and Ineffective
One of the main purposes of the current tax provisions is to
provide incentives for companies to increase their investment in
R&D. 6 Such an incentive is necessary because, in some cases, the
societal benefits of R&D exceed any benefits that private compa-
nies would receive from conducting these activities on their own.5
50. Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 1180, 34 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 2637 (Dec. 17, 1999).
51. In fact, amending section 41 has been on President Bush's tax agenda since he
took office. See George W. Bush, The President's Agenda for Tax Relief (Jan. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter President's Agenda for Tax Reliefi, available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/reports/taxplan.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003); see also infra Part
III.C.2.
52. A "perfect" tax system would attain three goals: efficiency, equity, and simplicity.
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 25-29 (4th ed. 2001). "The efficiency criterion requires that a tax interfere as lit-
tle as possible with people's economic behavior." Id. at 26.
53. Mitchell B. Weiss, International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phe-
nomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99, 102 (2001).
54. See generally id. (explaining the economic implications that globalization has had
on the tax system).
55. R&D tax incentives were originally intended to encourage R&D in order to stimu-
late the economy and encourage innovation. Natbony, supra note 14, at 349. Although the
economy still needs to be stimulated, R&D is now needed for other reasons as well, such as
to protect the United States from future terrorist attacks. See infra Part III.B.
56. See, e.g., Wamsley, supra note 24, at 166 (referring to the § 41 tax credit enacted
in 1981).
57. See, e.g., id. at 186; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR
1220
TAX INCENTIVES
Although companies often conduct R&D without tax incentives,
they generally only do so when they know it will be profitable.
Companies are reluctant to conduct other R&D that might be
more beneficial to society but would be less profitable; for exam-
ple, in the area of homeland security. Although Congress at-
tempts to encourage some of the less profitable R&D through sec-
tions 41 and 174 of the tax code, the current tax incentives are
inefficient and ineffective at accomplishing this goal for several
reasons:5" (1) the current tax provisions discriminate against
some types of R&D; (2) not everyone qualifies for the tax incen-
tives; (3) the provisions require periodic updating; and (4) the
provisions have a reduced effective rate.
1. Current Tax Provisions Discriminate
The current tax provisions are inefficient because of their dis-
criminatory nature. Section 174, the broader of the two tax provi-
sions, does not apply to all R&D expenses. Rather, some expenses
for land and property are excluded from section 174."9 Section 41,
on the other hand, is very narrow in its applicability." As stated,
it only applies to "qualified research expenses" and "basic re-
search payments," both of which are narrowly defined.61 For ex-
ample, section 41 does not apply to "research conducted after the
beginning of commercial production of the business component";
"research related to the adaptation of an existing business com-
ponent to a particular customer's requirement or need"; "research
related to the reproduction of an existing business component...
from a physical examination"; "[s]urveys, studies, etc."; or "re-
search with respect to computer software."62
CONGRESS: TAX PREFERENCES FOR RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION; ARE CHANGES
NEEDED? *1 (1995), available at 1995 WL 582410.
58. "[T]heir combined effect on after-tax rates of return to R & E investments proba-
bly falls short of bridging the documented gap between social and private returns on R &
E investment." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *7. See Natbony,
supra note 14, at 348 (concluding that "the present system of current deduction and in-
cremental credit provides a significant subsidy, but a very questionable incentive, for re-
search and development activity").
59. See I.R.C. § 174(c) (2000); see also supra Part II.A.
60. See I.R.C. § 41 (2000).
61. See id. § 41(a)(1), (2); see also supra Part I.B.
62. I.R.C. § 41(d)(4).
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Although sections 174 and 41 may have met their intended
purpose at the time they were enacted, by discriminating against
some types of R&D the current tax provisions are an inefficient
means of providing a tax incentive for the general R&D that is
now needed.63
2. Not Everyone Qualifies
Secondly, the current tax provisions are inefficient because
many companies do not qualify for their benefits. In particular,
many companies are not able to take the credits available under
section 41 of the tax code. For example, fast growing companies
usually cannot claim the section 41 credit because their R&D ex-
penses have not grown as fast as their sales; therefore, their
qualified research expenses do not exceed their base amount.6 4 In
addition, recently merged companies may not qualify for the tax
credit because, when the companies merge, some R&D expenses
could be eliminated as a result of the merger. 65 In a slowing econ-
omy, declining businesses also may not qualify because they may
lower R&D expenses in order to maintain profitability. Although
these businesses may still conduct R&D operations, because these
expenses do not exceed their base amount, the company would
not be eligible for the section 41 credit.66 Therefore, the current
provisions fail to encourage all R&D because many companies are
not eligible for the tax incentives. In order to create a more effi-
cient tax incentive for R&D, all companies engaging in R&D -no
matter how new, wealthy, or big-should be able to qualify for the
incentives.
3. Requires Periodic Updating
The third problem with the current system is that, due to its
incremental nature, it must be updated regularly. Section 41(c)(3)
defines fixed-base percentage using the years 1984 through
1988.67 By calculating the section 41 credit based on certain tax
63. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *1, *8, *13.
64. Id. at *1, *14; see also I.R.C. § 41(a)(1).
65. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *14.
66. Id. at *15.
67. I.R.C. § 41(c)(3).
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years, the provision must change periodically in order to stay cur-
rent and continue to be an effective incentive for R&D. Since the
provision will require periodic updating, section 41 cannot become
a permanent provision of the tax code without changing the
statutory language to exclude the specific reference dates.6"
Although the tax code should not theoretically alter behavior,69
the short-term nature of the R&D tax provisions does, in fact, al-
ter the behavior of companies relying on the R&D credit. Know-
ing that the tax credit provision of section 41 could be eliminated
in future years because it is not permanent, many companies re-
frain from entering into long-term R&D projects that they would
otherwise consider exploring.7" For example, a company consider-
ing a long-term research project that would rely heavily on the
tax incentives for financial reasons may decide not to start or in-
vest in the project due to the possibility of Congress eliminating
the tax incentives for R&D. For these reasons, the non-
permanent nature of the section 41 tax credit makes the provision
an inefficient incentive.
4. Reduced Effective Rate
The last inefficiency with the current provision has to do with
the effective rate of the tax credit found in section 41. Although
section 41 purports to allow a credit of "20 percent of the ex-
cess,"71 the effective rate of the credit is actually much less than
twenty percent for many reasons.
First, the "recapture provision "1 2 has the effect of lowering the
overall effective rate of the credit because any R&D credit re-
ceived under section 41 must be deducted from the section 174
immediate deduction. Therefore, companies lose deductions by
claiming the section 41 R&D credit. Although companies should
not necessarily be able to claim both tax incentives, the recapture
provision decreases the effective rate of the section 41 credit.
68. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *1.
69. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 52, at 26.
70. President's Agenda for Tax Relief, supra note 51.
71. I.R.C. § 41(a)(1).
72. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *9.
73. Wamsley, supra note 24, at 187.
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Second, because the base amount cannot "be less than 50 per-
cent of the qualified research expenses for the credit year,"74 the
effective rate of the credit is cut in half for many companies.75
These companies include those "whose R & E-to-sales ratios have
more than doubled since the base period of the mid-1980s,"76
those "with ratios more than twice the 16-percent maximum fixed
base percentage... , [and] start-up firms with ratios above 6 per-
cent or more than double their transition ratios."77 Due to the
limitations that section 41 places on the R&D credit, these types
of companies are not able to receive the full twenty percent credit
that section 41 claims to offer for R&D.
Lastly, the effective rate is "reduced to the extent that R & E
spending boosts future sales substantially."7 ' As companies en-
gage in research resulting in successful development, sales for
these companies will increase. As sales increase these companies
are required to raise their base amounts, as figured in section
41(c). As the companies' base amounts increase, their amount of
credit is reduced. This reduction in the effective rate of the credit
has the tendency to punish companies that engage in R&D and
are successful in their sales.
Although Congress intended for a R&D credit of twenty per-
cent,79 due to the limitations on the credit, very few, if any, com-
panies actually receive a credit of twenty percent. As years go by
and companies grow as a result of their R&D, the effective rate of
the credit decreases. If Congress wants to continue to encourage
R&D, the effective rate of the credit cannot continue to decrease.
74. I.R.C. § 41(c)(2).
75. "One effect is that despite its 20% label, the actual value of the credit can never
exceed 10% of the taxpayer's R&D expenditures over time, because when R&D exceeds
twice the taxpayer's normally defined base, the base is redefined by the creditable expen-
ditures." Natbony, supra note 14, at 402; see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, su-
pra note 57, at *9.
76. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *9. "R&E-to-sales ratio" is
the ratio of the companies R&D (research and experimentation) expenses for the year to
their sales for the year. For example, a company with $100,000 in R&D expenses for the
year and $1,000,000 in sales for the year, would have an R&E-to-sales ratio of 10%. See id.
Over several years, if the companies' R&D drastically increases when compared to their
sales, the R&E-to-sales ratio will more than double. By doubling their R&E-to-sales ratio,
the company will not be able to claim a credit for their entire R&D increase, because sec-
tion 41 limits the credit to fifty percent. I.R.C. § 41(c)(2).
77. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *9.
78. Id. at *10.
79. I.R.C. § 41(a)(1).
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B. Recent Events Increase Need for Research and Development
1. Homeland Security
On September 11, 2001, two planes crashed into the World
Trade Center in New York City, one plane crashed into the Pen-
tagon in Arlington, Virginia, and a fourth plane crashed in Penn-
sylvania. As the story unfolded, Americans discovered that the hi-
jackings were the actions of terrorists. Since the terrorist attacks
on America, politicians and the American public have realized the
need for change and increased security measures in the United
States in order to protect this country from future terrorist at-
tacks."0 As President George W. Bush stated: "Americans will
never forget the murderous events of September 11, 2001. They
are for us what Pearl Harbor was to an earlier generation of
Americans: a terrible wrong and a call to action.""1
Immediately following the attacks, President Bush recognized
the need for changes in the government to promote homeland se-
curity: "This effort will involve major new programs and signifi-
cant reforms by the Federal government. But it will also involve
new or expanded efforts by State and local governments, private
industry, non-governmental organizations, and citizens. By work-
ing together we will make our homeland more secure." 2 To ac-
complish this, President Bush established the Office of Homeland
Security on October 8, 2001.3 The functions of the Office of
Homeland Security, headed by Secretary Tom Ridge, former
Pennsylvania Governor, are "to detect, prepare for, prevent, pro-
tect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within
the United States."8 4
80. Since September 11, 2001, Americans have responded with many changes. Con-
gress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(also called the "USA Patriot Act of 2001"), which "authorize[s] new powers for the federal
government to prevent future terrorism." Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Developments:
USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435 (2002).
81. George W. Bush, The Budget Message of the President (Feb. 4, 2002), in A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FIscAL
YEAR 2003.
82. BUSH, supra note 1, at 3.
83. Exec. Order No. 13,228, 3 C.F.R. 796 (2001).
84. Id. § 3, at 796.
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To help accomplish these functions, the Office of Homeland Secu-
rity is to "identify programs that contribute to the Administra-
tion's strategy for homeland security and, in the development of
the President's annual budget submission,... review and provide
advice to the heads of departments and agencies for such pro-
grams."8" Over the last year, many new programs have been es-
tablished and existing programs increased for the protection of
homeland security. In fact, in President Bush's fiscal year 2003
budget request to Congress, it was proposed to increase the
budget for homeland security by $18.2 billion-from $19.5 billion
in 2002 to $37.7 billion in 2003.86 Although many federal pro-
grams already exist to aid in the protection of homeland security,
many politicians, including Secretary Ridge and President Bush,
argue that additional programs are needed.
One area that needs to be expanded drastically is the area of
R&D.88Although politicians have recognized the need for in-
creased R&D in the area of homeland security, there are few eco-
nomic incentives for such work. Since much of the R&D that
needs to be done for homeland security has a greater benefit to
society as a whole than to any one individual company, companies
are and will continue to be reluctant to engage in these activities
without greater government incentives. For this reason, incen-
tives need to be changed to encourage companies to engage in
homeland security R&D. 9
85. Id. § 3(l), at 799-800.
86. BUSH, supra note 1, at 8.
87. "Numerous federal grant programs and grant-making corporations already exist
that give money for research related to homeland security." Thomas Cmar, Recent Devel-
opments: Office of Homeland Security, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 465 (2002).
88. "Science and engineering have critical roles to play in the war on terrorism. We
need improved tools with which to prevent, detect, protect, and treat victims of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and conventional terrorist attacks. Additionally, we will
need new and improved tools to recover facilities from those same types of attacks, should
they ever occur." John Marburger, Speech at the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science Symposium, The War on Terrorism: What Does it Mean for Science? (Dec.
18, 2001), available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/02 1_09_2.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2003).
89. See infra Part II.C for two proposals for changing R&D tax incentives.
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2. Biological and Chemical Weapons
In his commencement address at the United States Military
Academy at West Point, President Bush described one of the
many needs for R&D in the United States:
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism
and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nu-
clear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology-when that
occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastro-
phic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this
very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons.
They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm
our friends-and we will oppose them with all our power.
90
As President Bush recognized, biological and chemical weapons
have become one of the biggest threats to the security of the
United States, and more R&D is necessary in order to alleviate
that threat.
From the use of chemical and biological agents during World
Wars I and I191 to the Sarin gas attacks in the subway system in
Japan,92 the threat of biological and chemical weapons has be-
come apparent many times in the last few decades.93 After the
Japanese use of chemical and biological weapons during the
90. George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy
at West Point (June 1, 2002), in THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 13 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ns/nss.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2003).
91. Sharon Begley, Tracking Anthrax, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 2001, at 36, 36 (describing
how "Japan's Air Force scattered millions of bubonic-plague-carrying fleas and other
pathogens from planes over 11 Chinese cities" killing over 700 people).
92. Members of the cult Aum Shinrikyo dispersed a deadly nerve agent, Sarin gas, in
the subway system in Tokyo, Japan on March 20, 1995. The attack killed twelve and in-
jured over 5,500 people. Nicholas D. Kristof, Hundreds in Japan Hunt Gas Attackers After
8 Die, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at Al; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Japanese Police Raid
the Offices of a Sect Linked to Poison Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at Al; Sheryl
WuDunn, Sect Says Government Staged the Gas Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at
A10.
93. See generally Robert Stevens, Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy Nguyen,
Ottilie Lundgren, and Lisa J. Raines Biological and Chemical Weapons Research Act, S.
1764, 107th Cong. § 2(C) (2001) [hereinafter Biological and Chemical Weapons Research
Act] (stating that "[tihere is a long and sordid history of chemical and biological weapons,
including use during the First and Second World Wars, an accidental release of anthrax
spores in 1979 from a Soviet military microbiological facility, use of mustard gas, tabun,
and hydrogen cyanide by Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and against the Kurds, and develop-
ment by Iraq of an offensive biological weapons capability including anthrax and botulium
toxin").
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World Wars, the United States began studying chemical and bio-
logical weapons.94 Despite the Geneva Convention's ban on
chemical and biological weapons after World War I, the weapons
continued to be used worldwide.95 In 1979, anthrax was released
in the Soviet city of Sverdlosk, killing several people.96 The first
use of biological weapons in the United States occurred in 1984
when salad bars in Oregon were infected with salmonella by fol-
lowers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh" Although no one died, 751
people were affected by the poisoning.9 Biological and chemical
weapons were used during the wars and conflicts in and around
Iraq. In 1987, Iraq dropped mustard gas on Kurd villages, killing
at least thirty-three and injuring over 450. 99 Since that time, Iraq
has produced and maintained "a stockpile of biological weap-
ons."'00 More recently, the Aum Shinrikyo cult has obtained and
used chemical and biological agents in Japan several times over
the last decade. 10' The cult dispersed strains of anthrax and
botulinum in Tokyo several times from 1990 to 1995.102 Its most
prominent attack occurred on March 20, 1995, when the cult re-
leased a nerve agent, Sarin gas, in the subway system in Tokyo
killing twelve and injuring over 5,500 people. 103
Although chemical and biological weapons have been used nu-
merous times, the threat did not significantly affect the lives of
Americans until the United States was attacked with anthrax in
October 2001. As America was recovering from the terrorist at-
tacks, an anthrax-contaminated letter killed a man in Florida in
late September 2001. Over the next month, fourteen cases of an-
94. See Begley, supra note 91, at 37.
95. Loren Jenkins, Iranians Detail Charges of Gas Warfare, WASH. POST, May 11,
1987, at Al.
96. Kevin Coughlin, Researchers Leading Attack on Anthrax: Promising Therapies,
Drugs Are in the Pipeline, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at A3.
97. Sharon Begley, Unmasking Bioterror, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8, 2001, at 24.
98. Id.
99. Jenkins, supra note 95, at Al.
100. Molly Moore, Iraq Said to Have Supply of Biological Weapons: Arsenal Adds to
Peril of Forces in Gulf Region, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1990, at Al; see also U.S. Report
Cites Iraqi Threat: Intelligence Survey Projects a Nuclear Weapon in a Decade, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at A17.
101. Begley, supra note 97, at 24-25.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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thrax were discovered, 104 resulting in three deaths, and over
14,000 people were treated for possible anthrax exposure. 1 5
These attacks, and the continued existence and threat of
chemical and biological weapons,0 6 have shown the "need [for]
improved tools with which to prevent, detect, protect, and treat
victims of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and conven-
tional terrorist attacks. Additionally, we will need new and im-
proved tools to recover facilities from those same types of attacks,
should they ever occur." 107
Since the anthrax attacks, the federal government has re-
sponded by proposing an increase of $4.5 billion to the federal
budget for defending against biological terrorism, for a total of
$5.9 billion in 2003.'08 Although this funding includes "$2.4 bil-
lion to [jump-start] the research and development process needed
to provide America with the medical tools needed to support an
effective response to bioterrorism,"1 9 federal funding alone is not
enough to fully respond to the problem of biological and chemical
weapons, particularly the need for R&D.
For years, the federal government has invested in research
aimed at defending our military from chemical and biological at-
tack. However, as we have seen recently, the nature of chemical
and biological weapons means everyone, not just military person-
nel, is at risk. For this reason, R&D for the prevention of and pro-
tection from chemical and biological weapons will be of great
benefit to all of society."'
104. Begley, supra note 91, at 36 (detailing how anthrax was discovered at American
Media Inc. (Florida), NBC (New York), and Senator Tom Daschle's office (Washington,
D.C.)); Howard Fineman, I Need Scientists!, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 42 (stating that
"[t]races of contamination were found in three U.S. House offices, a local post-office sub-
station and the off-site mailrooms of the White House, the State Department, the CIA and
the Supreme Court").
105. Fineman, supra note 104, at 42.
106. Countries suspected to have (or to have had in the past) chemical and biological
weapons include: Algeria, Czechoslovakia, China, Cuba, Egypt, Great Britain, India, Iraq,
Iran, Israel, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and Sudan. Begley, supra note
91, at 36; Begley, supra note 97, at 20.
107. Marburger, supra note 88.
108. BUSH, supra note 1, at 12.
109. Press Release, The White House, Defending Against Biological Terrorism (Feb. 5,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020205-1.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
110. See generally id.; Memorandum from the Office of Management and Budget, Pro-
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C. Proposals for Change
1. S. 1764: Robert Stevens, Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Cursen,
Kathy Nguyen, Ottilie Lundgren, and Lisa J. Raines
Biological and Chemical Weapons Research Act"'
On December 4, 2001, Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman
introduced Senate Bill 1764 entitled: "Robert Stevens, Thomas
Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy Nguyen, Ottilie Lundgren,
and Lisa J. Raines Biological and Chemical Weapons Research
Act."" 2 The bill intends to prepare the United States "with diag-
nostic and medical countermeasures in the event of the use of bio-
logical and chemical weapons by terrorists and others against
both military personnel and civilians.""' As discussed previously,
incentives for R&D, particularly for biological and chemical
weapons research, are necessary because companies are not likely
to pursue such research without incentives. By providing incen-
tives to biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, this bill
helps give companies assurance that their research will be profit-
able."1
4
Senate Bill 1764 would provide two incentives to biotechnology
and pharmaceutical companies. First, the legislation would pro-
vide three possible tax incentives to companies that are regis-
tered with the Office of Homeland Security and conduct research
for priority countermeasures." 5 Second, after a company success-
fully develops a countermeasure, the legislation would provide
procurement, patent, and liability provisions." 6
Companies would be able to choose from among three different
tax incentives. Under the first option, companies "may establish a
limited partnership for the certified countermeasures re-
search.""' 7 As a partnership, the partners would be able to take
deductions and credits, rather than being subject to corporate
tecting the Homeland (Jan. 20, 2001).
111. Biological and Chemical Weapons Research Act, S. 1764, 107th Cong. (2001).
112. See 147 CONG. REC. S12376 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Joseph
Lieberman).
113. S. 1764 § 12(1).
114. Id. § 1(12)-(13).
115. Id. § 6.
116. Id. §§ 7-9.
117. Id. § 6(1).
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taxation rules. The second option would allow companies to issue
stock to fund research; investors in such stock would be subject to
a special capital gains tax rate of zero." 8 The third option would
allow companies to get tax credits based on countermeasure re-
search.119 Although Senate Bill 1764 provides three alternative
incentives for countermeasure research, the incentives would not
be available to companies with over $750 million in paid-in capi-
tal.120 In addition, companies claiming the benefits of this bill
would not be eligible for other benefits, such as those available
under the Orphan Drug Act.
121
After a company develops a countermeasure, several other in-
centives are available under this bill. Companies have the option
to sell the product to the federal government at a pre-established
price and in a pre-determined amount. 2 2 The company is also
able to benefit from patent options not available for other prod-
ucts. Under current law, the term of a patent does not change, re-
gardless of the amount of time that it takes for the FDA to ap-
prove the product. 23 However, under this legislation, the patent
for countermeasure priorities would not be affected by the FDA
approval process. Rather, the term of the patent would not begin
until after the product had been approved.1 24 In addition, compa-
nies that develop priority countermeasures will have the option
under this legislation to extend their patent for up to two years. 25
118. Id. § 6(2).
119. Id. § 6(3).
120. Id. § 6(2)(B).
121. Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360cc, 360ee (2000). The Orphan Drug Act "allows
drug companies to take tax deductions for about three-quarters of the cost of their clinical
studies" for "drugs and other products for treating rare diseases." U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN. CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT:
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS 37 (1999) [hereinafter IMPROVING HEALTH
THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS], available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-
full.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
122. S. 1764 § 7(e)(2).
123. The FDA review process can take anywhere from six months (for priority drugs) to
one year (for standard drugs) or more. The review process has been substantially changed
and improved over the last few years as a result of The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of
1992. IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS, supra note 121, at 7; see also Pre-
scription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
124. S. 1764 § 8.
125. Id.
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Lastly, the legislation addresses another problem with biotech-
nology and pharmaceutical research: failure to conduct research
for fear that the company may be subject to liability, should the
countermeasure not work correctly. This legislation would miti-
gate that fear by providing liability protection to companies that
develop priority countermeasures.126 Liability protection under
this bill would protect companies through indemnification and
provide a defense against claims that the R&D caused damages
or losses.
127
2. President Bush's Tax Relief Plan: The Research and
Experimentation Tax Credit
Another proposal, made by President George W. Bush, consists
of several different parts, all aimed at improving national secu-
rity in light of the events over the last year. He "believes that we
must harness the power of current technologies, and invest in the
next generation of technologies, to achieve his three main goals
for America: winning the war on terrorism, providing for greater
homeland security, and strengthening the economy. "128
As part of President Bush's tax relief plan, he would encourage
R&D by making the R&E tax credit permanent. 129 The current
R&E tax credit, set to expire in 2004, has been a "temporary" tax
incentive since it was enacted in 1981.13° Although intended to
encourage R&D, "[t]he on-again, off-again nature of the tax credit
impedes long-term research in the U.S."1 1 By making the R&E
tax credit a permanent part of the tax code, President Bush hopes
to create an incentive for long-term R&D.132
Although proposals to make the R&E credit permanent have
been made many times since its enactment in 1981, President
Bush has made more serious attempts at enacting his proposal.
126. Id. § 9.
127. Id.
128. U.S. Office of Science & Technology Policy, An Unprecedented Commitment to In-
novation and New Technology, at http://www.ostp.gov/html/techbudget.pdf (last visited
Mar. 17, 2003).
129. President's Agenda for Tax Relief, supra note 51.
130. See Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 Stat. 241
(1981).
131. President's Agenda for Tax Relief, supra note 51.
132. Id.
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On February 4, 2002, President Bush. submitted his federal
budget of $2.1 trillion to Congress.133 Included in his budget was a
decrease in receipts due to making the R&E credit permanent.
This changed provision is estimated to decrease receipts by $1.05
billion in 2004 and $49.5 billion over the period 2002 to 2011.134
President Bush's budget included other provisions for R&D,
such as increased funding for federal R&D, 135 basic research,13
R&D for homeland security,137 and for the Patent and Trademark
Office.13 In addition to making the R&E tax credit permanent,
President Bush would also like to "broaden[ I access to the re-
search and experimentation tax credit to make it easier for com-
panies to deduct many costs associated with developing new
technologies and drugs."139
IV. POLICY ARGUMEN4TS
As the need for R&D increases and proposals are made for
R&D incentives, it is necessary to explore whether tax incentives
are, in fact, an effective method of encouraging R&D. Several
scholars argue that tax incentives are "an ineffective means of
providing a federal subsidy."14' These scholars-including Stanley
S. Surrey,4  Paul R. McDaniel,"' Boris I. Bittker,4 3 Victor
133. Bush Urges Congress To Make EGTRRA Permanent and Proposes $591 Billion in
Tax Cuts, [2002] 89 Stan. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 2002 WL
9410788.
134. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, A BLUEPRINT FOR NEW BEGINNINGS: A
RESPONSIBLE BUDGET FOR AMERICA'S PRIORITIES 194 tbl. S-9 (2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/blueprint.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2003).
135. $111.8 billion in 2003. U.S. Office of Science & Technology Policy, Research and
Development Highlights, at http://www.ostp.gov/html/R&Dhighlights.pdf (last visited Mar.
17, 2003).
136. U.S. Office of Science & Technology Policy, supra note 128. Basic research is uni-
versity-based research. President Bush proposed an increase of nine percent in university-
based research for next year. Id.
137. Id. President Bush's budget included $3 billion for homeland security R&D. This
is an increase from $1 billion in 2002. Id.
138. Id. An increase of $212 million is proposed to encourage R&D by improving the
Patent and Trademark Office. Id.
139. Economic Outlook, Statement to the Senate Joint Econ. Comm., 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of R. Glenn Hubbard, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers).
140. Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1155
(1988).
141. Stanley S. Surrey was a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. In addition,
20031 1233
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1213
Thuronyi,"' and others-believe that direct subsidies would bemore effective at providing assistance to those in need.
Although many scholars argue that tax incentives are ineffec-
tive, others argue that tax incentives are and can be effective.14
Many legal and economic scholars believe, for example, that tax
incentives are necessary to encourage R&D. In fact, many of the
scholars that disagree with tax incentives in general believe that,
for R&D purposes, tax incentives are effective.
14 6
A. Policy Arguments Against Tax Incentives
Many scholars argue that tax incentives are "actually govern-
ment spending programs disguised in tax language."'47 Under
this theory, scholars believe that the incentives would be more ef-
fective as direct federal subsidy programs for several reasons:
complexity, costs and windfalls, evasion of review, government
supervision and control, and behavior distortion.14 In addition,
they believe that tax incentives take away from the three policy
goals of a well designed tax system: equity, efficiency, and sim-
plicity. 49
from 1961 to 1969, Surrey was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy.
142. Paul R. McDaniel is a Harvard Law School graduate and Professor of Law at New
York University.
143. Boris I. Bittker is a Professor Emeritus of Law at Yale University and is the au-
thor of several popular treatises. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS (2d ed. 1989); BORIS I. BITTKER &
MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS (2d ed. 1995).
144. Victor Thuronyi, a 1980 graduate from Harvard Law School, served as Special Le-
gal Advisor for Fundamental Tax Reform at the Treasury Department from 1984 to 1986.
He is also an Associate Professor of Law at SUNY-Buffalo.
145. For example, Edward A. Zelinsky argues that "tax incentives may be more effi-
cient for the implementation of government policies than direct expenditure programs be-
cause of lower transactions costs." Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (1986).
146. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *2.
147. Thuronyi, supra note 140, at 1155.
148. See generally id. at 1205 (proposing a category of substitutable tax provisions that
would "replacte] certain tax provisions with nontax programs"); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 734 (1970) (stating that "as a generaliza-
tion, I think it unlikely that clear advantages in the tax incentive method will be found").
149. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 52, at 25.
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1. Complexity
First, it is argued that the United States tax system is too
complex. Adding tax expenditures/incentives to the tax system
creates unnecessary additional complexity because direct subsi-
dies can fulfill the same purposes as tax expenditures.150 By
eliminating tax expenditures, the tax system will come closer to
meeting the policy goal of simplicity.
2. Cost and Windfalls
Second, scholars argue that tax incentives cost more than di-
rect spending programs' 5' and create windfalls. 5 2 A windfall is
created because the tax expenditures provide benefit to taxpayers
even though they would have done the activity without the bene-
fit. 153 Although it might be true that in some cases a windfall is
created, the same situation occurs with direct subsidies. Any gov-
ernment subsidy program will create some windfalls due to the
inherent nature of subsidies.5 4 However, a well-drafted subsidy
or tax expenditure will minimize the amount of windfalls created.
3. Evades Review
Next, many scholars argue that tax expenditures evade review
because they are "hidden" in the tax code, rather than being un-
der the public eye as in a direct subsidy program.'55 Direct sub-
sidy programs are reviewed numerous times by Congress, the
President, agencies, and the public. 5 6 Because of the abundant
150. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current
Developments and Emerging Issues, in FEDERAL INCOME TAX ANTHOLOGY 299-302 (Paul
L. Caron et al. eds., 1979); Surrey, supra note 148, at 728-29, 732; Thuronyi, supra note
140, at 1157; William G. Gale, Tax Credits: Social Policy in Bad Disguise, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 16, 1999, at 11.
151. "[T]he subsidies [tax expenditures] provide cost the federal government more than
direct spending programs would." Thuronyi, supra note 140, at 1161.
152. Surrey, supra note 148, at 719.
153. Id.
154. Id. ("A direct expenditure program similarly structured would be equally open to
the charge.").
155. Thuronyi, supra note 140, at 1161, 1163 (stating that tax expenditures "evade pe-
riodic budgetary review" and it is "difficult to detect spending programs in disguise").
156. Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, in
2003] 1235
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1213
review and scrutiny, direct subsidy programs are likely to be
more efficient than tax incentives.
In addition, tax expenditures evade review by the appropriate
congressional committees and agencies. Since all tax legislation is
reviewed in the House of Representatives by the House Ways and
Means Committee,'57 and in the Senate by the Senate Finance
Committee,15 tax expenditure legislation avoids review by other
committees and agencies that know more about the particular
subject or subsidy.159 These committees have more expertise on
the particular subject matter of the subsidies and are better able
to scrutinize it. 6 ' The House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee, on the other hand, have expertise
in taxes. By creating tax expenditures rather than direct subsi-
dies, the program is not subject to the same scrutiny and review.
After passing through Congress, tax expenditures are then "ad-
ministered by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), an agency
FEDERAL INCOME TAX ANTHOLOGY 303 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 1979) (noting that tax
expenditures "escape the public and congressional scrutiny that accompanies the appro-
priation of governmental funds").
157. The House Ways and Means Committee has jurisdiction over:
(1) Customs, collection districts, and ports of entry and delivery. (2) Recipro-
cal trade agreements. (3) Revenue measures generally. (4) Revenue measures
relating to the insular possessions. (5) Bonded debt of the United States, sub-
ject to the last sentence of clause 4(f). (6) Deposit of public monies. (7) Trans-
portation of dutiable goods. (8) Tax exempt foundations and charitable trusts.
(9) National social security (except health care and facilities programs that
are supported from general revenues as opposed to payroll deductions and
except work incentive programs).
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES X(1)(s), H.R. Doc. No. 106-320, 106th Cong.,
2d Sess. (2001), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/about.asp? (last visited Mar.
17, 2003).
158. The Senate Finance Committee has jurisdiction over:
1. Bonded debt of the United States, except as provided in the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974. 2. Customs, collection districts, and ports of entry and de-
livery. 3. Deposit of public moneys. 4. General revenue sharing. 5. Health
programs under the Social Security Act and health programs financed by a
specific tax or trust fund. 6. National social security. 7. Reciprocal trade
agreements. 8. Revenue measures generally, except as provided in the Con-
gressional Budget Act of 1974. 9. Revenue measures relating to the insular
possessions. 10. Tariffs and import quotas, and matters related thereto. 11.
Transportation of dutiable goods.
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE XXV, S. Doc. No. 106-15, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000),
available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/sitepages/jurisdiction.htm (last visited Mar.
17, 2003).
159. Surrey, supra note 148, at 705 (stating that tax expenditures are "handled by tax
committees and administrative agencies which have little expertise in non-tax social pol-
icy"); see also Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 150, at 301-02.
160. Surrey, supra note 148, at 705.
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unfamiliar with the substantive problems addressed by subsidies
and unable to coordinate tax expenditures with subsidy programs
administered by other agencies."161
Although many argue that tax expenditures evade review,
since 1974 the Treasury Department has prepared an annual tax
expenditure budget that is submitted to Congress with the an-
nual budget.16 2 By including the tax expenditure budget in the
annual budget, tax expenditures are subject to public and Con-
gressional scrutiny. 63 In addition, some tax expenditures, includ-
ing the section 41 R&D tax credit, have "sunset" provisions. 64 A
sunset law is "[a] statute under which a governmental agency or
program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period
unless it is formally renewed." 6 ' By adding a sunset provision to
tax expenditures, the expenditure becomes subject to the periodic
review that scholars argue is missing from tax expenditures.
4. Government Supervision and Coordination
Yet another argument deals with the amount of government
supervision and coordination in direct subsidies versus tax ex-
penditures.1 66 Tax incentives, unlike direct subsidies, receive very
little government supervision after being incorporated into the
tax code. 167 However, it is much easier for the government to co-
ordinate all direct subsidies to accomplish policy goals.1 68 Tax ex-
penditures, on the other hand, are more difficult to coordinate
with the direct subsidies in order to ensure that policy goals are
met and government assistance is granted where needed. 169
161. Thuronyi, supra note 140, at 1161.
162. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297, 313 (1974); Thuronyi, supra note 140, at 1170; see also JIM SAXTON, TAX
EXPENDITURES: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE STUDY (1999),
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tax/expend.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
163. See Thuronyi, supra note 140, at 1170.
164. I.R.C. § 41(h) (2000).
165. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1450 (7th ed. 1999).
166. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 148, at 706-17.
167. Id. at 714 (stating that tax incentives "involve[ ] no government supervision over
the details of the action to be induced, whereas a direct expenditure involves detailed su-
pervision").
168. See id. at 728.
169. Surrey, supra note 148, at 730, 731 (noting the "difficulty of coordinating the
treatment of tax incentives with the overall handling of direct expenditures" and that tax
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5. Distorts Behavior
Finally, it is a widely-held view that the United States tax sys-
tem is inefficient 170 because it distorts behavior.'71 Since the tax
system, and particularly tax incentives, encourage taxpayers to
engage in certain activities, the current tax system interferes
with behavior and thus is not efficient.' 72 Under this belief, using
tax incentives to carry out federal subsidies is an inefficient
method of federal spending. Because of the nature of the tax sys-
tem, tax incentives tend to benefit people in higher tax brackets
more than lower income taxpayers. 17 3 This distortion is due to the
fact that higher income taxpayers generally have more knowledge
of the incentives and have the resources that enable them to take
advantage of such incentives-i.e., accountants, lawyers, etc.'74
Therefore, it is argued that using the tax system to carryout fed-
eral subsidy programs takes away from the original purpose of
the subsidies-to benefit those in need.1 75
Although it may be true that, under the traditional definition
of efficiency, 76 it is inefficient to use the tax system for federal
subsidies, the tax system is not necessarily inefficient under other
definitions of the "efficiency" goal. For example, if a tax system is
said to be efficient "when it promotes economic growth and ineffi-
cient when it inhibits such growth,"177 it could be argued that the
current tax system is "efficient" in many respects. In addition,
even if some tax expenditures cause the tax system to be ineffi-
expenditures "greatly decrease[] the ability of the Government to maintain control over
the management of its priorities"); Thuronyi, supra note 140, at 1172 (stating that "[tihe
variance in treatment between tax expenditures and direct spending programs makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate tax expenditure and spending policy").
170. GRAETz & SCHENK, supra note 52, at 26. "The efficiency criterion requires that a
tax interfere as little as possible with people's economic behavior." Id.
171. Weiss, supra note 53, at 102 (stating that the tax system is "economically ineffi-
cient" because it distorts behavior).
172. See id. at 101.
173. Surrey, supra note 148, at 705 (arguing that "incentives are usually less equitable,
since they benefit persons in high tax brackets most").
174. Cf. id. at 720 (stating that low income taxpayers do not benefit from tax deduc-
tions because they pay no income tax).
175. See id.
176. For purposes of this paper, the "traditional" definition of efficiency is the meaning
discussed in the previous paragraph; that is, an efficient tax system does not interfere
with "people's economic behavior." GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 52, at 26.
177. Id. at 27.
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cient, this does not mean that all tax expenditures should be
eliminated from the tax system.
171
Finally, although some tax expenditures do, oin fact, benefit
higher bracket taxpayers more than others, this is not true over-
all. In fact, some tax expenditures are not intended to benefit the
lower income taxpayers. In those situations, benefits to higher in-
come taxpayers may be the goal and may therefore meet the pur-
pose of those particular tax expenditures. The R&D tax incentives
currently found in the tax code are examples of such provisions.
179
B. Tax Incentives As a Means of Encouraging Research and
Development
Although many scholars argue that tax incentives are an inef-
ficient method of carrying out federal programs, other scholars
argue that tax incentives are efficient and should not be elimi-
nated from the tax code. 8° Some of the reasons for this belief in-
clude:' 8 ' (1) tax incentives avoid the bureaucracy of other federal
programs;'82 (2) tax expenditures can take effect immediately
upon enactment of the legislation by avoiding the bureaucratic
"red tape";18' and (3) tax expenditures have lower transaction
costs than other subsidy programs.
184
Although arguments exist showing that tax expenditures, in
general, are not inefficient, the scope of this paper is focused on
178. See infra Part IV.B.
179. See infra Part IV.B for further discussion on R&D tax incentives.
180. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budget: A Criti-
cal View, 54 TAx NOTES 1661, 1663 (1992) ("[Tlax expenditure budgets have the unfortu-
nate tendency to confuse by inviting an easy equation of 'tax expenditures' with direct ex-
penditures of federal dollars. Tax expenditures automatically become 'subsidies.' And
central questions about the appropriate goals for our American income tax get lost in the
transition.").
181. These points are only being briefly discussed because they go beyond the scope of
this paper, which focuses on the R&D tax incentives, rather than tax incentives in general.
Although many arguments against tax expenditures in general were discussed in Part
IV.A, those arguments are applicable because many scholars argue that all tax expendi-
tures, including those associated with R&D, should be eliminated. Therefore, these argu-
ments were discussed in order to show some of the arguments that scholars have against
R&D tax expenditures.
182. See Surrey, supra note 148, at 716.
183. See id. at 716-18.
184. Zelinsky, supra note 145, at 975 (providing a "dissent from the prevailing consen-
sus that condemns tax incentives as invariably inefficient").
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the R&D tax incentives, rather than tax incentives in general.
Therefore, this section will discuss the policy reasons for using
tax incentives to encourage R&D.
1. An "Exception to the Rule"
While some scholars argue that tax incentives are an ineffi-
cient method of carrying out federal programs, most of these
same scholars agree that R&D is an "exception to the general
rule."" 5 In fact, some note that "[w]hen it comes to research, gov-
ernment intervention may actually improve economic effi-
ciency."" 6
First, without incentives the amount of R&D undertaken by
private businesses would be insufficient to fulfill the needs of the
United States. ' Since companies generally only undertake R&D
that will result in large profits for the company, many R&D pro-
jects are ignored or avoided by private businesses."8 8
In particular, private businesses are not likely to undertake
R&D in the area of homeland security, because the research is
not likely to result in high profits for the company. 8 ' For exam-
ple, a company is not likely to conduct R&D on a counter-
terrorism measure, such as a gas-mask, because the mask would
be primarily used for government purposes. Products that are
primarily used for government purposes are not as profitable to
companies because, when the government controls the demand
for the product, the government is able to fix the price based on
what they are willing to pay. Therefore, it is necessary for the
government to give private companies the incentive to undertake
such research. 90
To economists, the phenomenon of needing R&D that is not
profitable to businesses is called "spillover." 9' Under this theory,
185. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *3.
186. Id.
187. See id. at *2.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. See supra Part III.B.
191. A "spillover," also called an "externality," is "[a] social or monetary consequence or
side effect of one's economic activity, causing another to benefit without paying or to suffer
without compensation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 604 (7th ed. 1999); see also
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the benefits of R&D spillover to society, and, therefore, even
though it may not be that profitable for private businesses, R&D
is important for society.192 Some of the benefits to society include:
"lower prices and/or improved products for purchasers, rais[ed]
living standards of all who consume them, and making the inno-
vating nation's products more attractive in international competi-
tion."193 In the area of homeland security, spillovers are prevalent;
that is, the R&D is more beneficial to society than it is to the pri-
vate businesses who actually conduct it.
Since benefits from R&D spillover to society, tax expenditures
and incentives are necessary to encourage private businesses to
conduct such activities that may not be that profitable to the
company. 194
Second, tax expenditures for R&D are effective under a cost-
benefit analysis. Under a traditional cost-benefit analysis, a deci-
sion, project, etc. is ineffective if the costs outweigh the bene-
fits.19 In the case of tax expenditures, a tax expenditure is "only
socially desirable if the targeted activity produces an uncompen-
sated benefit or harm on society."'96 In most cases, economists
and scholars believe that tax expenditures do not benefit society,
but rather, harm society by distorting behavior.197 As discussed
previously, R&D creates spillovers that outweigh the harms that
R&D tax incentives cause by distorting behavior. Therefore, un-
der a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits of R&D tax incentives
outweigh the costs.
For these reasons, tax expenditures for R&D are generally ac-
cepted as an efficient use of the tax system to accomplish federal
subsidy goals.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *2.
192. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *1-2.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. In general terms, cost-benefit analysis is "[a]n analytical technique that weighs
the costs of a proposed decision, holding, or project against the expected advantages, eco-
nomic or otherwise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 350 (7th ed. 1999).
196. Weiss, supra note 53, at 101.
197. Walmsley, supra note 24, at 183.
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2. Tax Incentives Versus Other Federal Subsidies
Although R&D tax incentives are an "exception to the general
rule" and are not as inefficient as other tax incentives,19 are tax
incentives the most effective means of fulfilling the government's
intention? Would R&D incentives be more effective in the form of
government grants, interest free loans, etc.? This subpart will ad-
dress those questions and show that R&D tax incentives are a
necessary part of the federal government's efforts to encourage
R&D.
In any federal issue, the government has several options for
creating a subsidy. The government can create tax expendi-
tures,'99 give government grants, 00 allow interest-free or reduced-
interest loans,20' create federal insurance programs, or guarantee
private loans.20 2 The same options apply to R&D. The government
encourages R&D through tax incentives such as sections 41 and
174 of the Internal Revenue Code, grants for R&D which will
benefit society,20 3 loans for companies engaged in R&D, and spe-
cial tax rules for R&D.20 4
Some people argue that, rather than using tax incentives, the
government should use other methods to fulfill the need for R&D,
198. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *3.
199. Tax expenditures are "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 299
(1974); see also FEDERAL INCOME TAX ANTHOLOGY 296-312 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds.,
1997) (including selections from Stanley S. Surrey, Paul R. McDaniel, Boris I. Bittker, Vic-
tor Thuronyi, Douglas A. Kahn, and Jeffrey S. Lehman); GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note
52, at 38-53. Currently, tax expenditures for R&D are found in I.R.C. sections 41 and 174.
See infra Part II.
200. Grants are given to individuals or organizations which meet certain requirements,
for the purpose of carrying out some government policy. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
EDUC., FUNDING YOUR EDUCATION 2003-2004 3 (2003), available at
http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/attachments/siteresources/FundingYourEducationEnglis
h2003_04.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2003).
201. One clear example of this is education loans. The government provides reduced
interest rate loans for educational expenses through the Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFEL). See id. at 10.
202. See id.
203. R&D grants, called "academic earmarks," are given to colleges and universities for
specific projects. In 2001, $1.67 billion was given in academic earmarks. See OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 2, at 175.
204. For example, businesses can treat R&D expenses differently for tax purposes. See
infra Part III.C (discussing Sen. Joseph Lieberman's proposal).
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particularly in the area of homeland security. In general, how-
ever, there is a "policy consensus that it would be allocatively effi-
cient and desirable overall to use tax ... law to increase the
amount of resources devoted to investment in general and to
[R&D] in particular."20 5 However, there are several reasons why
tax incentives should be used for R&D.
First, the federal government cannot be responsible for all
R&D that is important for the needs of the nation.2 °6 It does not
have sufficient resources to fully fund every project in which R&D
is necessary. However, by providing a tax credit for such enter-
prises, the government is able to fulfill R&D needs without taking
on the financial burden of the entire project. Eliminating R&D
tax incentives and fulfilling the R&D needs through other subsi-
dies alone would not only be financially impossible in a capitalist
market, but would also lead to bigger government, as well as to
the stifling of R&D through government bureaucracy.
Second, even if the government uses other methods to encour-
age R&D by private entities, those methods will not be as effec-
tive as tax incentives. Businesses are very sensitive to taxes, and
therefore are more likely to respond to a tax incentive than to a
different type of incentive.20 7 Thus, by including tax incentives in
a plan to encourage R&D, the government will be more successful
in encouraging businesses to engage in R&D without further gov-
ernment assistance. In addition, other incentives would likely in-
volve "political or bureaucratic decisions," which the private sec-
tor seeks to avoid if at all possible. 2" Therefore, tax incentives
would be more effective at encouraging the private sector to con-
duct R&D than other incentives.
205. Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law To Increase Re-
search and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and
Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 63, 66 (2002).
206. This concept of government funded projects relates to fundamental economic prin-
ciples and arguments that are beyond the scope of this paper. However, most scholars
agree that the federal government should not be responsible for all R&D. Natbony, supra
note 14, at 399 (noting that 'few would argue that the federal government itself should
undertake all [R&D]").
207. Contra Surrey, supra note 148, at 733 (arguing against the common belief that
businesses respond better to tax incentives than direct subsidies).
208. "The credit encourages [R&E] by private businesses without political or bureau-
cratic decisions." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 57, at *1.
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V. CONCLUSION
There is a definite need for R&D incentives in the United
States. The events of the last year have created an even more
pressing need for homeland security R&D. Accordingly, the fed-
eral government needs to encourage these activities. Although
the tax code currently has two provisions to encourage R&D,
these provisions are insufficient to fulfill America's need.
Even though some scholars argue that tax expenditures are in-
efficient, tax incentives for R&D are efficient and necessary.
However, tax incentives should not be the only means that the
government uses to encourage R&D. Rather, the federal govern-
ment should use tax incentives in conjunction with other federal
subsidy programs. By using tax incentives and other federal sub-
sidy programs, the government will create the most effective
means of encouraging R&D, particularly in the next few years
when it is a crucial part of homeland security.
Jennifer L. Venghaus
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